United States lessons about school accountability by Eric Hanushek





ERIC A. HANUSHEK *
The United States has launched a new experiment
designed to improve its schools. The most publi-
cized portion of this is the current federal educa-
tional policy to expand school accountability based
on measured student test performance. Although
many states had already installed accountability
systems by 2000, a central campaign theme of
George W. Bush was to expand this to all states,
something that became a reality with the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). The landmark
NCLB codified a developing policy view that stan-
dards, testing and accountability were the path to
improved performance. This discussion provides
evidence on the expected effects of NCLB not only
on student performance but also on other potential
outcomes.
Accountability has been a catchword in education
for decades.While it seems natural to measure out-
comes and hold schools responsible for them, the
mechanics of how to do that appropriately are
complicated. Considerable con-
troversy accompanies account-
ability in schools. Parents, teach-
ers, policy makers, and the
American public frequently
enter into debate about various
elements and uses of account-
ability systems. These debates
are motivated by different
underlying views about how
best to improve the education of
our youth as well as by self-
interested reactions.
Understanding the dynamics of the United State
education system sheds light on the current thrust
towards accountability and the issues facing
today’s policy makers. In simplest terms, student
performance has stagnated while costs have steadi-
ly increased. These simple facts have led to the
realization that just providing more resources
within the current structure is unlikely to be effec-
tive.Nor does adding further regulation offer much
promise.
This stagnation is illustrated by the results of the
National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP), which regularly tests students across the
country in different subject areas. The tests, which
have been conducted over the past three decades,
start with a random sample of students from dif-
ferent grade levels.A summary of the performance
of 17-year-olds over time is provided in the Figure.
The Figure tracks average scores in reading, math,
science and writing. The story is one of flat
achievement. Reading and math scores are slightly
higher at the end of three decades, while science
and writing appear to have noticeably declined.
Level performance would not be a matter of seri-
ous concern except for two important additional
trends. First, it parallels mediocre performance 
on the international level,where the United States
has performed at or below average since the
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Hoover Institution, Stanford University.1960s.1 Second, the US performance has not been
for want of trying. As the Table shows, school
resources have been increased over the same peri-
od of time. Real spending per student more than
tripled between 1960 and 2000. This increase in
resources was accomplished in the way typically
called for by reformers and policy makers: by sig-
nificantly reducing pupil-teacher ratios, by increas-
ing the training of teachers and by developing a
more experienced teaching force.
The dominant approach to policy making over
much of this period has been regulation of educa-
tion inputs and processes along with providing
resources for specific school programs. This
approach has been especially appealing to legisla-
tures, because it is easy to set resource policy. But,
as shown in the aggregate data,increased resources
have not improved performance. Moreover, these
overall impressions have been reinforced by simi-
lar findings of analyses of performance across
classrooms and schools (Hanushek 2003).
This lack of improved performance has brought
attention to alternative means of effecting change in
schools. This attention has been manifested in a
variety of forms, but a common theme has been the
regulation of outcomes rather than the more tradi-
tional regulation of process and inputs. Previous
efforts were based on providing or prescribing spe-
cific inputs (such as reduced class size in specific cir-
cumstances) and hoping that these led to improved
student performance. Often, however, these deci-
sions were based on little information that would
indicate high probabilities of success.The new regu-
latory frameworks tend to emphasize objective out-
comes, while letting schools decide how they would
meet demands for achievement. The underlying
idea is that public monitoring and reporting of stu-
dent outcomes, perhaps coupled with consequences
for schools, teachers or students will be more suc-
cessful than previous input-based policies.
Design of accountability systems
Each state in the US has developed its own student
accountability system, and, while NCLB provides
some guidelines, the states remain pre-eminent in
developing school policy and accountability.NCLB
did, however, dramatically change the focus of
schools by declaring that all students would
achieve some measure of proficiency within a
dozen years.
The basic skeleton of accountability systems
involves content standards, measurement, conse-
quences and reporting.While states differ in signif-
icant ways, a general description of the structure of
these systems is useful in comparing actual plans
and how their elements interact.
Content standards
Content standards typically present the details of
what is expected in each subject and grade. They
create boundaries or domains for attention. The
typical student outcome standards delineate a
body of material that has been designated by an
authoritative body to represent a minimum accept-
able set of knowledge to be mastered by the stu-
dent. Although apparently straightforward, the
creation of precise standards has been fraught with
difficulty. Tension exists between the need for a
representative set of elements and the need for the
elements to be testable (discussed below).
Measurement
The biggest controversy in accountability probably
surrounds how compliance with standards should
be measured.Proving that the standards have been
met requires some sort of measurement.Assessing
compliance requires several decisions:who to mea-
sure; what approach to use; how to create valid
indices; and, frequently, where to set the critical
value or cut-point for meeting the standard.
The centerpiece of current state accountability sys-
tems is the testing of student performance. This
performance is then aggregated to, say, the school
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Public school resources in the United States
1960–2000
1960 1980 2000
Pupil-teacher ratio 25.8 18.7 16.0
Percentage of teachers with 
master’s degree or more 23.5 49.6 56.2
a)
Median years teacher 
experience 11 12 15
a)
Real expenditure/pupil
(in US$) 2,235 5,124 7,591
a) Data for 1996.
1 At least in recent years, these results do not reflect international
differences in selectivity of schooling or test taking but instead
appear to reflect more fundamental forces.A summary of the per-
formance of countries across the tests along with references to the
basic data can be found in Hanushek and Kimko (2000).CESifo DICE Report 4/2004 29
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or district level, and some summary of the test
scores is made public.
Deriving composite measures
While most of the public attention has gone to the
development of standards and how to measure
compliance with them, the use of resulting data,
particularly when there are multiple objectives, is
equally important. The goal of an accountability
system is improving student performance, but per-
formance is the outcome of a variety of factors:stu-
dent ability and effort, parental inputs, teacher
inputs, and school programs and resources. Even
with accurate and reliable data on student perfor-
mance, the outcome statistics produced must
reflect the actions of the actors if they are to enter
appropriately into performance incentives.
The issue of disentangling underlying elements of
performance is most frequently raised in assessing
the performance of teachers and schools.If we take
accountability down to each schools and teachers,
it is common sense that none should be held
responsible for bad performance by others. For
example, if a teacher starts with low-performing
students but does a terrific job of improving their
performance, she should not be penalized if the
resulting performance level is still lower than, say,
the national average. Similarly, a teacher starting
with a high-performing group should get credit for
her job in improving them but not for their initial
preparation. The implication is that any measure-
ment of teacher quality should focus on the
teacher’s addition, or value-added, to student
learning – and this requires adjusting the measure-
ment of student performance according to the ini-
tial preparation of students.
The best way to separate the different factors that
influence student performance is not obvious. A
variety of approaches has been proposed and
experimented with in the states.The most common
starting measure – applied in virtually every exist-
ing accountability system – is the average of all stu-
dent test scores for a district or a school. This
aggregate summary, however, mixes all sources of
performance. Extensions that have been proposed
and used in different places include:
•A nnual change in school average score over
time
•A verage of the mean individual gains in scores
•A verage scores of a school relative to state aver-
age scores for students of similar background
•R egression adjusted scores to remove individ-
ual background differences.
These measures also highlight a fundamental ten-
sion between the incentives that are created by the
way a given accountability system is structured and
the overall performance goals they are supposed to
promote. For example, for many uses it may be
desirable to pinpoint the value added by each
school,but even a high value added school may start
with students sufficiently ill-prepared that the
school does not bring them up to the desired levels
of student performance. Looked at from the view-
point of enforcing high standards of student perfor-
mance, this school might be judged as falling short –
while from the incentive side, this school would
deserve praise. This apparently simple issue illus-
trates the difficulties of using student performance
data simultaneously for multiple goals. A common
approach is for states to create incentives involving
a combination of the level of score and the school
change in score over time (such as seen in school
reward systems in North Carolina and California).
Uses and consequences
Goals, standards, and measurements create an
accountability system. But in most states, account-
ability systems have multiple objectives – including
creating a measuring rod for outcomes, improving
school instruction, creating incentives and creating
rewards/punishments for performance.
The standards and accountability movement
strives to induce alignment between standards,
teaching and student performance. In contrast to a
regulatory approach, the underlying philosophy of
accountability is letting the actors maintain control
of a process whose outcomes are scrutinized.
Consequences – both positive and negative – are
the fulcrum that gives leverage to the other players
in the education system. If schools or students do
not expect any decisive actions as a result of their
performance, there is little to motivate attention to
the outcomes they produce.
No child left behind
The No Child Left Behind program took the state
systems that were developed and layered on new
aspects that related largely to consequences ifschools did not show improvement in student
scores. Specifically, NCLB required states to devel-
op a plan for ensuring that their students will even-
tually be proficient in the basic subjects.A key ele-
ment is tracking whether schools are meeting “ade-
quate yearly progress”. This is a measure of
whether the state and the school are following on
an acceptable trajectory.2 If schools are not per-
forming well by these standards, they face increas-
ing requirements to support the students in the
schools with more choice of schools, with supple-
mental services and ultimately with the ability to
leave a public school completely and to find a bet-
ter school. The school itself may even, at some
point, be dissolved.
The key element added by NCLB is a set of sanc-
tions against schools that perform poorly. These
sanctions require, at least in principle, that the
school aid the student in finding better schooling
that brings the student to proficient levels.The fed-
eral program, however, is only one element. The
states include their own rewards and sanctions for
schools that do well or do poorly. A clear change
has been the universal introduction of conse-
quences (in the future) for schools that do not per-
form well as measured by student achievement.
Assessing the results
Although it is not possible to investigate the impact
of NCLB directly, it is possible to assess the impact
of the underlying state accountability systems that
were introduced before the federal legislation. This
discussion summarizes a more detailed statistical
analysis found in Hanushek and Raymond (2005).
The inability to assess NCLB comes from a variety
of factors. First, and most importantly, the majority
of states had already instituted some sort of
accountability system by the time the federal law
took effect. Although only 12 states had account-
ability systems at the school level in 1996, 39 states
did so by 2000.Thus, there is no ready comparison
group that can indicate what might have happened
without any law. Second, the law has many facets
making it hard to isolate the effects of any single
one. Finally, the common pace of implementation
of NCLB across the states eliminates any status
quo alternatives for comparison.
Nonetheless, it is possible to assess how the prior
state accountability systems impact student out-
comes. The varied introduction of accountability
across states during the past decade permits analy-
sis of how this institution affects student learning.
Moreover, because NCLB is based on individual
state systems, the prior state structures are gener-
ally very closely related to their responses to the
federal legislation.
The basic analytical approach builds on informa-
tion about state differences in mathematics and
reading performance as identified by the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
Although these tests are not the ones employed by
the states in their accountability systems, they do
provide a common assessment of performance
across the states (something that is not available
with the individual and different tests used by each
state). We directly analyze how performance
growth on each test between grade 4 and grade 8 is
affected by whether or not a state applies a test-
based accountability system.
Extensive analyses of educational production func-
tions have been conducted, and they form the rele-
vant background for this work. Those studies have
concentrated on describing how various inputs to
schools enter into the determination of student out-
comes. As described elsewhere, however, these
studies have not provided any consistent picture of
how schools affect student performance (Hanushek
2003).
Many different state policies, regulations, and
incentives – although poorly identified and mea-
sured – enter into determining student perfor-
mance. State educational policy encompasses a
wide range of factors including financial structure,
collective bargaining rules and laws, explicit regu-
lations on educational processes, and the like. The
complications for the analyst are multiple.
The objective is to separate the impact of account-
ability from other possible influences on student
achievement. But, if these other influences cannot
be readily measured and cannot be directly con-
trolled for in any statistical analysis, they are likely
to be correlated with accountability, making accu-
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2 This discussion is a very simplified one that leaves out many
details. In fact these provisions have been very controversial, in
part because it is difficult to specify the ways of meeting the objec-
tive while being both flexible and serious about the results.As with
most new systems, the exact provisions will undoubtedly evolve
over time.CESifo DICE Report 4/2004 31
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rate identification of the impacts of accountability
on achievement impossible.
The analysis summarized here relies on three
related approaches to the statistical disentangle-
ment of the impacts of accountability.First,impor-
tant components of general state factors that influ-
ence achievement – either from policy or from the
character of the state population – will influence
student achievement at multiple levels of school-
ing.Therefore, if we look at the growth of achieve-
ment over time – say, as used here, the change in
student performance between fourth and eighth
grades – common factors that have a constant
impact on the level of achievement over the obser-
vation period will be fully captured in the early
test score and thus will be implicitly controlled in
the statistical analysis. Second, from the multiple
observations of performance in each state over
time,it is possible to estimate a common state-spe-
cific growth rate for student performance.
(Technically, this amounts to extracting a state
specific fixed effect in the growth equations for
student scores). The easiest interpretation of this
approach is that we compare growth in achieve-
ment before and after a state introduces an
accountability system; that is, each state acts as its
own control for comparing the effects of account-
ability. Thirdly, a variety of time-varying factors
can be entered directly into the analysis.For exam-
ple, the pattern of spending on students in each
state or changes in the adult (parent) population
are readily measured and can be introduced to
avoid any complications that might arise from cor-
relations with the introduction of accountability
measures.
How accountability affects performance
There are straightforward findings from the statis-
tical analysis of student achievement.We find that
the introduction of accountability systems into a
state tends to lead to larger achievement growth
than would have occurred without accountability.
The analysis,however,indicates that just reporting
results has minimal impact on student perfor-
mance and that the force of accountability comes
from attaching consequences, such as monetary
awards or takeover threats, to school perfor-
mance. This finding supports the contested provi-
sions of NCLB that impose sanctions on failing
schools.
Much of the explicit interest in accountability and
the federal legislation, however, focuses on low
achievers. And, given the generally lower achieve-
ment of minority groups, an implicit assumption is
that accountability – as revealed through mandato-
ry disaggregation of performance for racial and
ethnic groups – will simultaneously close the large
racial/ethnic achievement gaps along with improv-
ing all performance. When we look specifically at
the performance of subgroups, we find that
Hispanic students gain most from accountability
while African Americans gain least.
The finding of differential effects of accountability
raises a clear policy dilemma. A prime reason for
the US federal government to require each state to
develop a test-based accountability system involved
raising the achievement of all students, but particu-
larly those at the bottom.It has done that,but not at
the same rate across groups. We conclude from this
that additional policies are needed to deal with the
multiple objectives.Again, as is frequently the case,
a single policy cannot effectively work for two dif-
ferent objectives – raising overall student perfor-
mance and providing more equal outcomes across
groups.
The movement toward stronger accountability in
schools has also suggested to many that there
would be adverse consequences – more exclusions,
higher dropout rates, a narrowing of the curricu-
lum,and the like.While some existing research sup-
ports these presumptions, it appears that the nega-
tive impacts are likely to be considerably overstat-
ed (Hanushek and Raymond 2003). Importantly,
many of the adverse effects that involve “gaming”
the system come from short-run incentives that are
unlikely to be present over time.3
Although not the focus of this discussion, it is
important to note that the character of currently
available accountability systems is not particularly
strong. This concern has two dimensions. First, the
educational standards and accountability systems
vary dramatically across states, and an analysis of
the underlying conceptual structures suggests that
different systems are expected to be associated
with stronger achievement gains because of the
incentives created – even though it is not possible
3 Hanushek and Raymond (2005) provide an analysis of special
education placement rates, one of the most cited areas for possible
abuse, but this indicates clearly that accountability has not had an
overall impact through this form of exclusions.to distinguish clearly among alternative quality rat-
ings in the statistical analysis.
Second, a majority of the systems concentrates on
overall achievement levels (with highly variable
passing scores across states). Such systems do not
generally provide clear signals about the value-
added of schools. Instead, they combine a variety
of effects including those resulting from family
background differences and neighborhood effects.
As such,they cannot provide truly clear and strong
incentives. Moreover, while there is a range of
potential consequences incorporated in state sys-
tems, it is not possible to investigate whether some
specific consequences are more powerful than oth-
ers. Yet, in the face of the rather blunt incentives
from existing systems, the introduction of account-
ability systems is associated with achievement
improvements on the order of 0.2 standard devia-
tions of student achievement. (This gain amounts
to moving students from the median of the distrib-
ution to the 58th percentile). Such improvements,
while not revolutionary, are notable when com-
pared to the failure to find alternative reforms that
yield such impacts on a broad basis. As account-
ability systems evolve, they are likely to have con-
siderably stronger impacts if they move in the
direction of more precise incentives for individual
schools.
Without doubt, the achievement of our students has
direct ramifications for the future well-being of soci-
ety (Hanushek 2004). It should be a very high prior-
ity to ensure that all of our students do in fact gain
the skills that will be needed as our economy grows
and evolves. Improved school accountability offers
much more promise than the failed input policies of
the past, although much is still to be learned.
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